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|On knowledge and ignorance|
|Haupttitel||On knowledge and ignorance|
|Titelzusatz||the strategic role of information in conflicts|
|Titelvariante||Über Wissen und Unwissenheit|
|Zusatz zur Titelvariante||die strategische Bedeutung von Information in Konflikten|
|Gutachter||Konrad, Kai A.|
|weitere Gutachter||Bester, Helmut|
|Freie Schlagwörter||Conflicts; Contests; War of attrition; Private provision of public goods; Information acquisition; Information sharing|
|Zusammenfassung||Conflictual social interactions create incentives for participants to seek a strategically favorable position prior to the conflict. This can influence the outcome in a decisive way, both if the conflict takes the form of a situation where the participants have diverging interests (e.g. military conflict or political competition) or if the participants, in principle, share a common interest (as, for example, in the case of environmental protection).
A crucial factor influencing conflict behavior and outcomes is the information that competing agents possess about their competitor, but also about their own potential gain or cost of choosing a certain action. Often, agents will be willing to spend a considerable amount of time or money in order to find out about the circumstances they are going to compete in, as typically ex ante they won't be fully informed of all variables determining their chances and the value of influencing a certain outcome in their favor. In the analysis of conflicts and contests, however, questions of information acquisition and the strategic role of information are mostly unexamined. This thesis gives consideration to the strategic relevance of decisions involving the change of the information available to contestants. Taking into account the possibility of acquiring or releasing information is important for the prediction of actual conflict behavior.
In five chapters, different conflictual situations will be analyzed, and it will be demonstrated how incentives to acquire or to share information can influence the outcome of the conflict. The first of the five chapters picks up on two widely studied information structures, and for several standard auctions, these information structures are compared with respect to agents' payoffs and revenue. The following two chapters consider incentives for information acquisition and for information sharing in perfectly discriminating contests. The fourth of the five chapters considers strategic information acquisition in the context of global warming where agents share a common goal. It is shown that there can be an incentive to ignore information in order to reduce the own contribution. The last chapter identifies a similar motive in the framework of a war of attrition.
|Tag der Disputation||29.01.2010|
|Erstellt am||02.05.2011 - 12:09:13|
|Letzte Änderung||02.05.2011 - 12:09:33|