old age security, path dependence, political economy, social expenditure, welfare reform, welfare regimes
This dissertation is a collection of three papers written within the DFG supported Doctoral Program Research on Organizational Paths.
The first part, entitled “Traveling without Moving? Pension regime change in mature welfare states”, explores how inherited social and economic arrangements in old age security provision; referred to as pension regimes, restrict reform options available to policymakers today. Results of the explorative multiple correspondence and hierarchical cluster analyses on a sample of up to 18 OECD countries (1988-2003) indicate that these legacies are responsible for the convergence of pension reform trajectories within regimes, suggesting that pension reforms in mature welfare states are following a logic of “bounded change”, where change takes place but pension regime differences persist. In a nutshell, the classification of old age security systems obtained from the correspondence analysis will be utilized in the second part of the analysis.
The second paper “Are Mature Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy? Evidence from 18 OECD countries, 1980-2003”, focuses on concrete pension financing rules rather than regime arrangements. Within the median voter framework it investigates how institutional differences mediate the effect of population ageing on the size and generosity of public pensions. Although mature pension systems face relatively similar challenges, tentative evidence from panel regression analysis indicates that majority voting in aging societies has two opposite effects: it increases overall pension spending as a percentage of GDP but decreases the generosity of pension benefits, depending on whether public pension entitlements are closely linked to contributions. Moreover, while issues of horizontal redistribution appear to matter less in voting on old age security, estimation results indicate that projected growth in population ageing creates momentum for reductions in pension spending and benefit generosity.
The third paper, which has been titled “What Makes Stabilization Reforms Happen? Temporality in the political economy of welfare spending”, takes a different view on temporal aspects in welfare reform policies. Instead of looking at long-term historical legacies, it investigates how temporal contexts influence the effectiveness of political determinants in welfare spending. To do so, the empirical analysis employs interactive dynamic panel regression and event history analysis on a dataset covering 21 OECD countries (1980-2003). While prior research indicates that popular theories of partisanship, electioneering and institutional rigidity are too general to explain recent developments in the dynamics of social expenditure, findings from the empirical analysis suggest that the influence of these political determinants re-emerges if temporal contexts are taken into consideration. Thus, it can be shown that politics still matters in welfare spending, but it matters in a more subtle way than in previous decades.
1. General Introduction (p. 5)
2. Traveling without Moving? Pension regime change in mature welfare states (p. 9)
3. Are Mature Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy? Evidence from 18 OECD countries, 1980-2003 (p. 73)
4. What Makes Stabilization Reforms Happen? Temporality in the political economy of welfare spending (p. 137)
German summary (p. 227)
Dataobject from FUDISS_thesis_000000006186
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