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Objekt-Metadaten
| On the Design of Firms and Organizations Puschke, Kerstin |
| Haupttitel | On the Design of Firms and Organizations |
| Titelvariante | Der Aufbau von Firmen und Organisationen |
| Autor | Puschke, Kerstin
Geburtsort: Keine Angabe |
| Gutachter | Prof. Dr. Helmut Bester |
| weitere Gutachter | Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz |
| Freie Schlagwörter | contract theory, decision rights, incomplete contracts |
| DDC | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Zusammenfassung | This thesis analyzes the internal organization of firms or institutions. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to contract theory. Why do firms exist at all, what determines their size and their internal structure? Contract theory uses incentive contracts and incomplete contracts to analyze the internal organization. An important issue in this context is the allocation of decision rights with respect to noncontractible decisions. Chapter 2 compares two organizational forms with respect to task assignment. The U-form (unitary form) is a function based structure, while the M-form (multidivisional form) is a process based one. The output of a process is observable; the output of a function is unobservable. Incentives are more effective under the M-form because there is no team problem. The U-form provides some cost savings due to specialization or economies of scale. If the functions are neither too substitutable nor too complementary, incentives are hard to provide and the M-form, even though creating higher costs, is optimal. In chapter 3, the allocation of decision rights in a joint project of two agents is analyzed under limited liability. The noncontractible decision under investigation influences both agents costs so that the decision-maker exerts an externality on the other agent. There are two distortional effects compared to a contractible decision. The rent extraction effect occurs if bargaining power does not reflect cost structure. The externality effect emerges since the decision-maker does not fully internalize the other agents costs. The created surplus is larger if the agent with steeper marginal costs is the decision-maker. But bargaining may allocate the decision right to the other agent if the agents cost functions are not too different and this agent has a lot of bargaining power. Chapter 4 investigates the optimal hierarchy. If one agent receives the decision right over all decisions, the hierarchy is vertical. If each agent receives the right to make one decision, the hierarchy is horizontal. The potential decision-makers have preferences which conflict with the organizations objective. In a vertical hierarchy, there is only one decision-maker to be incentivized. This advantage might be outweighed if a horizontal hierarchy enables an allocation of decision rights where each agent is in charge of the decision he cares less about. |
| Dokumente |
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| Fachbereich/Einrichtung | FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
| Erscheinungsjahr | 2007 |
| Dokumententyp/-Sammlungen | Dissertation |
| Medientyp/Format | Text |
| Sprache | Englisch |
| Rechte | Nutzungsbedingungen |
| Tag der Disputation | 23.10.2007 |
| Erstellt am | 09.11.2007 - 00:00:00 |
| Letzte Änderung | 19.02.2010 - 14:13:17 |
| Alte Darwin URL | http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2007/762/ |
| Statische URL | http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/receive/FUDISS_thesis_000000003209 |
| URN | urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudissthesis000000003209-0 |
| Zugriffsstatistik | |
